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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a jury verdict convicting him of the 
crime of Theft in the above-entitled matter in a trial held 
December 4 - 1 4 , 1990. Defendant also appeals from the judgment 
entered on said jury verdict, as well as the denial of his Motion 
for New Trial in this case entered by the Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy, Third District Judge, on April 27, 1993. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial judge erroneously fail to grant the 
Defendant's Motion to Reduce Judge Leonard H. Russon's Order 
Granting New Trial to Writing? The trial court's decision is 
reviewed under a legal correctness standard, with no deference 
given to the trial court's determination. State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
2. Were certain instructions given to the jury by the trial 
judge erroneous? The issue is reviewed for legal correctness 
since failure to properly instruct the jury in a criminal case 
can constitute reversible error as a matter of law. State v. 
Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991); State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235 
(Utah 1985) . 
3. Did the trial court err by failing to give certain 
specific instructions requested by Defendant? The standard of 
review is the same as in Paragraph 2 above. 
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4. Did the trial court err by allowing the State to impeach 
the Defendant through the use of his prior convictions entered on 
eighteen counts of Securities Fraud? Whether a piece of evidence 
is admissible is a question of law and an appellate court always 
reviews questions of law under a legal correctness standard. 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
5. Did the trial court err by allowing State's witness John 
Baldwin to testify concerning an investigation of Granada, Inc. 
for unregistered securities violations? The same standard 
outlined in Paragraph 4 above applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal are contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After Defendant was convicted of the crime of Theft in the 
above-entitled matter by a jury in a trial held December 4-14, 
1990, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, the trial judge in the 
matter, subsequently granted a Motion in Arrest of Judgment, set 
aside the jury verdict, and granted a Judgment of Acquittal in 
the case. It should be noted that Judge Russon also ruled he 
would have granted a new trial had he not granted the Judgment of 
Acquittal (R. 1619 p. 110). 
Subsequently, Judge Russon was appointed to fill a position 
on the Utah Court of Appeals and the Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
was appointed to take his place in this matter. 
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On October 20, 1992, Defendant made a "Motion to Reduce 
Judge Leonard H. Russon's Order Granting New Trial to Writing." 
Defendant also filed a "Motion for New Trial on Theft Conviction" 
on February 12, 1993. 
All of Defendant's post-judgment motions were denied on 
April 27, 1993 by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In 1979 a limited partnership called "Three Crowns, 
Ltd.", was formed for the purpose of acquiring an existing mobile 
home park in Las Vegas, Nevada. Three individuals, one of which 
was Defendant, originally created the partnership and served as 
general partners. These individuals sold limited partnership 
interests to several investors (R. 2056 pp. 106-108, 124-27). 
The Three Crowns Mobile Home Park was managed by an independent 
property manager until 1985 when a Utah corporation, Granada, 
Inc., assumed direct property management responsibility. Defen-
dant was a part owner and president of Granada, Inc. The limited 
partners included Defendant, his brother, and later by substitu-
tion, Defendant's wife (R. 2056 pp. 106-108, 129-130, 193). The 
limited partners also included the four individuals named in the 
Amended Information charging Defendant with theft. Granada, 
Inc., became the acting general partner in approximately 1980 (R. 
2056 pp. 127-130). 
2. From 1979 through October of 1986, this partnership 
owned and operated the Three Crowns Mobile Home Park. Some net 
profits were earned by the park from 1980 through 1986 (R. 2056 
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pp. 131-132; R. 2058 pp. 65-67). From time to time, these funds 
were loaned by Granada, Inc., the managing general partner of the 
partnership, at interest through a Granada account pending 
repayment and distribution to the limited partners (R. 2056 pp. 
132-137, 182). The purpose of these periodic loans was to 
provide additional income to the partnership and to increase the 
investment returned to the partners (R. 2056 p. 133; R. 2058 pp. 
114-117). These funds were normally loaned through the Granada 
Interoffice account (GIOA) or to other related borrowers because 
such accounts provided a higher interest rate and a better return 
to the partners than other commercial lending sources (R. 2056 
pp. 133, 168; R. 2058 pp. 114-117). 
3. In late 1985, the executive management committee at 
Granada, Inc., approved the sale of the Three Crowns Mobile Home 
Park, along with other property either owned by Granada or other 
separate partnerships (R. 2056 pp. 139-141; R. 2058 pp. 93-94). 
The sale of Granada properties was normally handled by either 
Keith Sorenson, a Granada officer and director, or Defendant who 
were assisted by other executives. Normally the executive 
committee, as a body, did not participate directly in the sale of 
properties. These responsibilities were delegated (R. 2056 pp. 
151-152; R. 2058 pp. 123-124). 
4. After reviewing and negotiating several offers over a 
period of eight to ten months, the Three Crowns Mobile Home Park 
was finally sold in October, 1986 providing net sales proceeds of 
$838,000.00 plus Granada's share of the sales commission (R. 2056 
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pp. 149, 167). Defendant and one of the Granada project execu-
tives, Kim Heaton, travelled together to Las Vegas and partici-
pated in the closing at the Nevada Title Company (R. 2056 pp. 38-
40, 150-151; R. 2061 pp. 2-6). After the closing and return to 
Salt Lake City, the $838,000.00 of net sales proceeds, plus 
Granada's commission ($235,000.00) were deposited in the Three 
Crowns partnership account. 
The majority of these funds (less certain operating 
expenses) was then loaned at interest through the Granada Inter-
office Account (GIOA) pending the resolution of some serious gas 
line leaks in the mobile home park and the resolution of certain 
liability claims against the park (R. 2056 pp. 33-36, 44, 168-
170). The GIOA account then placed these funds in other inter-
est-bearing accounts or loaned the funds to other borrowers (R. 
2056 pp. 178-179). 
5. Defendant testified at trial that it was always his 
intent, and the intent of Granada, Inc., and others to assure 
repayment of these funds with interest from the partnerships 
and/or other Granada sources. The sales proceeds advanced from 
the Three Crowns Partnership through the GIOA were loaned and 
documented in the same manner as other Three Crowns monies which 
had been previously loaned to other projects and subsequently 
repaid (R. 2056 pp. 132-137). 
6. Defendant testified that at the time the sales proceeds 
in question were loaned from the Three Crowns Partnership through 
the GIOA, he believed Granada, Inc. was financially able to 
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assure the repayments of the loans (R. 2056 pp. 180-181) . 
Indeed/ Lamar Hatch, the comptroller of Granadaf and all other 
executives of Granada who testified at the trial (Wayne Jensen, 
Steve Apple, and Dick Miller) all stated they believed in the 
financial stability of Granada until approximately January of 
1987, three months after sale of Three Crowns Mobile Home Park 
(R. 2056 pp. 115-118; R. 2058 pp. 121-122). 
7. At that time, a re-evaluation of the company's assets 
was performed at the direction of Defendant in order to determine 
the source and solution of the cash flow problems the company had 
been experiencing since mid-1986 (R. 2056 pp. 115-118; R. 2058 
pp. 65-67). Defendant testified that he was shocked to learn in 
January, 1987 that Granada might not have sufficient assets to 
insure repayment of both the Three Crowns Partnership loans which 
had been made in October of 1986 (R. 2056 p. 118) and other 
loans. 
8. Defendant and others testified that the option of 
Granada repaying the loan was further severely impaired a month 
later when the State of Utah forced Granada to file for Chapter 
11 Reorganization in Bankruptcy (R. 2056 pp. 123, 196; R. 2061 
pp. 17-25). 
9. Notwithstanding these severe problems which were com-
pounded by the State of Utah's actions, Defendant was able to pay 
in full two of the Three Crowns Limited partners (not related to 
Defendant), and arrange an exchange of a third partners' interest 
for another asset (R. 2056 pp. 193-196). 
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10. Defendant advised Ned Gregerson, a limited partner, of 
the sale at the time it occurred, and also advised him that 
partnership funds would be distributed to the limited partners 
(R. 2056 pp. 164-167; R. 2061 p. 53). All parties, including 
Defendant, were probably overly optimistic as to how soon this 
distribution could occur (R. 2056 pp. 160-161, 167; R. 2061 pp. 
53-55). However, the proceeds from the sale of the Three Crowns 
Mobile Home Park could not be distributed until the managing 
general partner was satisfied that all liability claims, or the 
potential for serious claims, from the leaking gas lines in the 
mobile home park had been resolved (R. 2056 pp. 155-161). This 
took longer than anticipated, and as a result no immediate 
distributions were made. 
11. Defendant openly advised Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson 
and Neal Mortensen of the sale or pending sale of the Three 
Crowns Mobile Home Park and of his intent to either make distri-
bution or reinvestment of their net sales proceeds as soon as it 
was prudent and reasonable to take such action (R. 2056 pp. 164-
167; R. 2057, pp. 36-37; R. 2061 pp. 53-55, 62, 74-78). Further, 
Defendant arranged with Neal Mortensen for the donation of part 
of his sales proceeds (R. 2057 pp. 37-40). It was Defendant's 
intent that these donations be completed. 
12. But for the intervention of the State, Defendant be-
lieved all these distributions would have been completed as 
intended (R. 2056 pp. 120-122, 180-187, 196). It was not until 
January, 1987 that anyone at Granada, including Defendant, had 
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any understanding that the company might be in a negative equity 
position of some 3 to 5 million dollars (2056 pp. 114-118; R. 
2058 pp. 69-72). Even then a workout plan was developed by the 
executive and workout committees which would have addressed this 
negative equity position and Granada's financial challenges (R. 
2056 pp. 120-122; R. 2061 pp. 17-22). All the executives who 
knew and understood the business thought the workout plan would 
succeed. The worst scenario occurred when the State forced 
Granada into a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy (R. 2056 pp. 123, 196; R. 
2061 pp. 22-25). As a result, the Three Crowns Partnership was 
forced to file a separate civil lawsuit against the Granada 
trustee in bankruptcy claiming that Three Crowns should receive a 
preferential payback (R. 2056 pp. 190-191). 
13. Defendant requested that John Chamberlain, a limited 
partner who had knowledge of mobile home parks, provide Granada 
and Defendant with information and references on any potential 
buyers. During the summer of 1986, Mr. Chamberlain referred two 
potential buyers to Defendant, neither of which materialized (R. 
2056 pp. 145-149). Mr. Chamberlain was advised when he contacted 
Defendant (after the closing in October, 1986), that the property 
had been sold (R. 2056 p. 147). However, his share of the sales 
proceeds were not disbursed to him in December, 1986 because of 
the potential liability claims from the hazardous gas lines (R. 
2056 pp. 155-160). At Mr. Chamberlain's request, he subsequently 
received, through an exchange, an interest in another mobile home 
park which Defendant believed had a higher value than the inter-
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est held by John Chamberlain in Three Crowns. Thus, through the 
exchange, Chamberlain received his full disbursement "in kind" 
from the Three Crown Partnership (R. 2056 pp. 193-195). The 
other partners named in the Information have not yet received 
their distribution although two other non-related partners have 
through the efforts of the Defendant received their distribution 
in full. All family related partners are still awaiting their 
distribution. 
14. At the time of the sale it had not been determined 
whether the partnership would engage or invest in other ventures 
as allowed in Paragraph 2.2 of the Certificate Agreement of 
Limited Partnerships. Defendant testified that it was generally 
understood that some of the partners would reinvest part or all 
of the their proceeds from the sale of the Three Crowns Mobile 
Home Park in other Granada partnerships at such time as proceeds 
were distributed (Exhibit 1-P, R. 2056 p. 200). 
15. It was Defendant's intent to provide distribution of 
sales proceeds to those partners who were not reinvesting their 
funds when the gas line problems with the mobile home park and 
liability claims had been resolved, and other closing costs paid; 
but such distributions would not take place until those contin-
gencies were resolved (R. 2056 pp. 187-188, 207-208). A majority 
of the partnership interests were owned by the Defendant, his 
family, and their direct associates. 
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16. Defendant was convicted of the crime of Theft in the 
above-entitled matter by a jury in a trial held December 4 
through December 14, 1990. 
17. The Honorable Leonard H. Russon subsequently granted a 
Motion in Arrest of Judgment, set aside the jury verdict, and 
granted a judgment of acquittal in the case. Subsequently still, 
Judge Russon/s decision was reversed by the Utah Court of Appeals 
and the matter remanded for reinstatement of the jury verdict and 
sentencing. 
18. On January 25, 1993, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
entered an Order sentencing the Defendant to the indeterminate 
term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for the 
second degree felony offense of Theft. Judge Murphy granted 
Defendant a stay of the prison sentence and placed him on proba-
tion under the supervision of the Utah Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole for a period of thirty-six months. Among 
the conditions of probation required by the Court were that the 
Defendant serve six months in the Salt Lake County Jail, which he 
commenced serving May 10, 1993 after the denial by Judge Murphy 
of his Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause. Defendant was 
also ordered to pay restitution in an amount to be determined by 
the Adult Probation and Parole Department. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the position of Defendant that the Honorable Michael 
R. Murphy erred by not entering a written order reducing Judge 
Leonard H. Russon's oral order for a new trial to writing as 
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requested by Defendant. Defendant argues that Judge Murphy in 
effect overruled the trial judge, a co-equal in this situation, 
in not entering an order granting a new trial. 
Defendant also argues that the trial judge should not have 
given certain instructions to the jury because said instructions 
were erroneous and mislead the jury. Among those instructions 
were the elements instruction of the case and an instruction 
stating that the formation of criminal intent in a theft case 
could occur at any time and did not have to occur at the time 
Defendant exercised unauthorized control over the property. 
Defendant argues that the intention to steal must have existed at 
the time of the taking and no subsequent felonious intent suffic-
es to carry the Stated burden of proving theft. 
Furthermore, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by 
failing to give specific instructions requested by Defendant 
regarding the nature of the law as to limited partnerships in the 
State of Utah; the time of forming intent in a theft case; and a 
good faith instruction, all of which were requested by Defendant. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by allowing 
the State to impeach him through the use of his prior convictions 
entered on eighteen counts of Securities Fraud. Defendant argues 
that under the circumstances of this case, the Court had discre-
tion to exclude the prior convictions despite the trial judge's 
rulings. Defendant also argues that the court should have 
excluded his prior convictions under the circumstances of this 
case because those convictions are presently on appeal. The Utah 
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Supreme Court granted a Writ of Certiorari to review Defendant's 
convictions on eighteen counts of Securities Fraud and that 
review is presently pending. Defendant also argues that his 
prior convictions for Securities Fraud do not necessarily involve 
dishonesty or false statement and therefore should not have been 
admitted by the trial court as impeachment of his testimony. 
Defendant further argues that the trial judge erred by 
allowing the State's witness John Baldwin to testify concerning 
an investigation of Granada, Inc. for unregistered securities 
violations. The subject matter of the instant theft charge 
against the Defendant involved a limited partnership called Three 
Crownsf but the State's witness was allowed to testify about an 
investigation of a real estate entity called Granada, Inc. which 




THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S "MOTION TO REDUCE JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON'S 
ORDER GRANTING NEW TRIAL TO WRITING" 
Although Defendant was convicted by a jury of the crime of 
Theft in a trial held December 4 through December 14f 1990, the 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon, the trial judge, set aside the jury 
verdict, arrested judgment, and further granted a judgment of 
acquittal in the case. The State appealed and caused much delay 
in the situation as a result of its appeal. Although the Utah 
Court of Appeals reversed Judge Russon's decision and ordered the 
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jury verdict reinstated and the Defendant sentenced on the charge 
of Theft, another fact needs to be considered carefully by the 
Court of Appeals. The Honorable Leonard H. Russon ruled on the 
record that had he not set aside the jury verdict and arrested 
judgment and granted a judgment of acquittal in the case, he 
would have granted a new trial (R. 1609 p. 110, Add. 1). 
As can be readily seen from page 110 of the transcript of 
Motions, Judge Russon ruled: 
. . . But in addition to that, I do make the 
following finding that in addition to that, if 
my ruling had been otherwise, I would have 
granted a new trial because I don't think the 
instruction clearly outlined that intent as is 
necessary in the element instructions. I think 
you can do something with a purpose, but I am 
not sure that that constitutes intent as re-
quired by the statute and defined earlier in 
the statute of a specific intent to deprive 
. . . 
(R. 1609, p. 110; Add. 1). 
Defendant filed in the lower court a "Motion to Reduce Judge 
Leonard H. Russon's Order Granting a New Trial to Writing" (R. 
2210-2220; Add. 2). However, Judge Murphy (who was appointed to 
the case when Judge Russon was appointed to the Court of Appeals) 
subsequently denied the Motion and stated that the aforementioned 
statements of Judge Russon were merely "musings on the record" 
and did not constitute a ruling, despite what Judge Russon had 
held (R. 2844). 
This issue becomes extremely relevant when one considers 
that the Defendant raised numerous substantive issues in his 
Motion for New Trial before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, all 
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of which were not considered by Judge Murphy to be "substantial 
enough to result in reversal, an order for new trial, etc.". Yet 
this was not the opinion of Judge Russon. 
It is Defendant Larsen's position that even though Judge 
Russon's ruling granting the motion for new trial was not reduced 
to writing, it still constitutes a valid order of the Third 
District Court and cannot be ignored. The comments of Judge 
Russon make clear that he was indeed making a "finding" and a 
"ruling". These were not simple musings on the record by Judge 
Russon, but clear determinations that he was issuing an order 
granting a new trial and urging the State to appeal such order 
for new trial simultaneously with their appeal of the issue of 
his arrest of judgment and judgment of acquittal. It is an 
undisputed fact that the State chose not to appeal Judge Russon7s 
order granting a new trial. 
The State also chose not to reduce Judge Russon's order 
granting a new trial to writing, presumably because it did not 
intend to accept his invitation to appeal the ruling. Defendant 
Larsen and his attorney were instructed to reduce the order 
arresting judgment and granting judgment of acquittal to writing, 
but Defendant was not instructed to reduce the order granting a 
new trial to writing. It is Defendant Larsen's position that the 
trial court should have simply reduced Judge Russon's oral ruling 
to writing and entered the order for a new trial, allowing the 
State to take its appeal if it chose to do so. 
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Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure entitled 
"Errors and Defects" states as follows: 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or vari-
ance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or 
other parts of the record and errors in the 
record arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time and after 
such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
It is Defendant Larsen's position that the Court should 
impose the standards of Rule 30 and simply enter a written order, 
which was not entered previously due to oversight or omission, 
since this Court may correct such oversight or omission at any 
time. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Kelsev, 532 P.2d 
1001 (1975), Justice Crockett, writing for a unanimous court 
(with two separate concurring opinions) dealt with a case in 
which the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins had heard a criminal case in 
a bench trial. Judge Wilkins placed an oral statement into the 
record regarding what he intended to do with regard to the 
judgment and verdict in the case, " . . . (h)owever, he resigned 
before written findings of fact and conclusions of law were made 
and placed in the file. . .". In reviewing Rule 63(a), U.R.C.P., 
the Court held that the term "other disability" involved a judge 
who resigned from the bench before he could complete his duties. 
The Court held: 
Inasmuch as the stated findings and verdict of 
Judge Wilkins at the conclusion of the trial 
were sufficient to meet the requirements of 
Rule 52, U.R.C.P., there could be no question 
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about the authority or propriety of the succes-
sor judge to make and sign formal findings of 
fact and conclusions of law which were consis-
tent with the findings and verdict of the judge 
who actually tried the case. (Emphasis sup-
plied) . 
532 P.2d at 1006. 
It is the position of Defendant that this case stands as 
precedent for the situation presently being reviewed by this 
Court. Since Judge Russon clearly made a "finding" and a "rul-
ing" orally from the bench, the mere fact that he resigned and 
left the bench before entering a written order did not give Judge 
Murphy carte blanche authority to overrule Judge Russon's "rul-
ing" and enter a different ruling. In fact, Defendant would 
argue that it is error under the Kelsey case for Judge Murphy to 
have done so. 
Judge Murphy should have been bound by the "law of the case" 
doctrine pronounced in several Utah cases, both civil and crimi-
nal. As pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
State of Utah v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125 (1989), "(T)he general 
rule is that one judge may not redetermine a previous ruling made 
by another judge in the same case. E.g., Sittner v. Bighorn Tar 
Sands and Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984); Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988) . . . ". 779 P.2d at 1129. Although the Court in 
Lamper found that if relevant circumstances had changed in the 
intervening period, the second judge may then re-examine the 
earlier ruling, the Court cited the example in that case of a 
change in the governing law. In the instant case, there have 
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been no relevant circumstances which have changed in the inter-
vening period. In fact, Judge Murphy was at a significant 
disadvantage in attempting to decide a motion for new trial in 
this matter, since his Honor did not hear the trial involved in 
this case. This circumstance is extremely significant. 
In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered the very circumstances of the instant 
case. In Saunders. the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
convictions for burglary, theft, possession of a firearm by a re-
stricted person, and being an habitual criminal, where a judge 
presiding at trial granted a motion for severance of charges 
which had been denied during pretrial proceedings by a different 
judge. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Hall held: 
. . . (W)here the judge presiding at trial is 
different from the one who denied the pretrial 
motion, as was the case here, to grant the same 
motion at trial, absent a change in the facts 
relevant to ruling on the motion, would be to 
overrule a co-equal. This would be improper. 
(Sittner v. Bighorn Tar Sands and Oil, Inc., 
Utah, 692 P.2d 735 (1984)". 
699 P.2d at 740. 
While the circumstances are a little different in the sense 
that the lower court in the instant case was not dealing with a 
pretrial motion granted by a co-equal judge, the court was 
dealing with a post-trial motion granted by Judge Russon, order-
ing a new trial for Defendant Larsen as an alternative to the 
motion in arrest of judgment. The Honorable Judge Murphy should 
have been expressly prohibited by the "law of the case" doctrine 
from overruling Judge Russon's decision. 
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It is the position of Defendant Larsen that the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy simply did not have the authority to overrule 
the order granting a new trial issued by his co-equal, the 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon. Furthermore, it is Defendant's 
position that Judge Russon was very clear and stated he was 
making a "finding" and "ruling," and was not simply having a 
discussion on the record with counsel. Therefore, it was preju-
dicial error for Judge Murphy to have overruled Judge Russon; and 
Judge Murphy's order denying Defendant Larsen a new trial should 
be reversed, and a new trial granted. 
POINT II 
CERTAIN INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY WERE ERRONEOUS AND 
CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 
(Utah 1991) , held that, "[A]n accurate instruction upon the basic 
elements of an offense is essential. Failure to so instruct 
constitutes reversible error as a matter of law." 823 P.2d at 
1061 (citing State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235 (Utah 1985). 
A. Instruction No. 22 was erroneous. 
It is Defendant's position that the Court erred in giving 
Instruction No. 22 which states as follows: 
In order to convict the Defendant of the 
charged offense, you must find that he exer-
cised unauthorized control over the property of 
another while acting with a specific intent or 
purpose to deprive the other person of his/her 
property, as defined in these instructions. It 
is not necessary that you find that the Defen-
dant formed such specific intent or purpose to 
deprive at the time he first obtained control 
over the property of another, but such a pur-
pose to deprive may be found at any period of 
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time in which the Defendant exercised unautho-
rized control over such property. (Emphasis 
added). 
R. 1862. 
Since Instruction No. 22 states that intent could be found 
at any timef Defendant maintains the jury was erroneously in-
structed. 
The intention to steal must have existed at the time of the 
taking and no subsequent felonious intent suffices to carry the 
State's burden of proving theft, in the opinion of the Defendant. 
See State v. Shonka, 279 P.2d 711, 713 (Utah 1955) (citing People 
v. Miller, 11 P. 514 (Utah 1886); State v. Allen, 189 P. 84 (Utah 
1920). See also. State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568 (Utah 1985). 
Therefore, Instruction No. 22 is an erroneous statement of 
the law and the giving of that instruction constitutes reversible 
error as it relates to the issue of the Defendant's intent. 
It should be reiterated here that the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, in reviewing Defendant's prior Motion in Arrest of 
Judgment or in the Alternative Motion for New Trial, noted that 
had he not granted the Motion in Arrest of Judgment, he would 
have granted a new trial in that he believed that the jury was 
not properly instructed as to the intent element of the offense 
before the Court in this case (See Point I, infra). Judge Russon 
stated, "[b]ut in addition to that, I do make the following 
finding that in addition to that, if my ruling had been other-
wise, I would have granted a new trial because I don't think the 
instruction clearly outlined that intent as is necessary in the 
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element instructions. I think you can do something with a 
purpose but I am not sure that that constitutes intent as re-
quired by the statute and defined earlier in the statute of a 
specific intent to deprive . . . ." (R. 1619, p. 110; Add 1). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (1980) held 
that failure to include the element of intent in the element 
instruction in a theft by deception case constituted reversible 
error, and this may have been the basis for Judge Russon's ruling 
granting the Defendant a new trial, 
B. The State failed to prove Defendant Larsen exercised 
unauthorized control over the property of the four 
individuals named in Instruction No. 23 
It is the position of Defendant Larsen that there was 
insufficient evidence to show that he exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of the four individuals named in the 
Information and Jury Instruction No. 23 (the elements instruc-
tion, R. 1863). Instruction No. 23 provided: 
Before you can convict the defendant of the 
crime of THEFT, as alleged in the Informa-
tion, you must find from the evidence, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of that crime: (1) That the defen-
dant exercised unauthorized control; (2) over 
the property of John Chamberlain, Ned 
Greqerson, Robert Nelson or Neal Mortensen; 
(3) with a purpose to deprive them thereof; 
(4) on or about October 10, 1986; (5) in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah; (6) and, that the 
value of said property exceeded $1,000.00. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes 
each and all of the foregoing elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find 
the defendant guilty of THEFT. 
On the other hand, if the evidence has failed 
to establish one or more of the foregoing 
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elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is 
your duty to find the defendant not guilty of 
THEFT. (Emphasis added). 
Limited partnership law is very clear that at the time the 
theft in the instant case is alleged to have occurred, none of 
the four individuals named in Instruction No. 23 (i.e., John 
Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson or Neal Mortensen) 
owned any of the partnership property. In fact, U.C.A. § 48-2a-
606 of Utah's Limited Partnership Act provides: 
At the time a partner becomes entitled to 
receive a distribution, he has the status of, 
and is entitled to all remedies available to, 
a creditor of the limited partnership with 
respect to the distribution. 
While this specific statute did not become effective until 
1990, Defendant maintains that the entire scheme of the Limited 
Partnership Act prior to (as well as after) its amendment has 
been to provide that a limited partner, at the time he becomes 
entitled to receive a distribution, has all the remedies avail-
able to a creditor of the limited partnership with respect to the 
distribution. The specific enactment of U.C.A. § 48-2a-606 
effective in 1990 merely codified and clarified that philosophy, 
which has permeated the entire Utah Limited Partnership Act from 
its inception; and is patterned after the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act. 
In addition, U.C.A. § 48-2-22, in effect at the time of the 
alleged theft in this case, provided that a creditor of a limited 
partner may charge only the interest of the indebted limited 
partner with payment of any unsatisfied claim. The statute 
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specifically statesf "The interest may be redeemed with the 
separate property of any General Partner, but may not be redeemed 
with partnership property." This statute establishes clearly 
that a limited partner has no right to, nor interest in, specific 
partnership property until an actual distribution occurs. 
One of the grounds for the Motion to Dismiss made by the 
Defendant at the end of the State's case, and later the Motion 
for Directed Verdict made by the Defendant at the end of all the 
evidence and prior to submission to the jury, was that the State 
had failed to present prima facie evidence, or any kind of 
evidence, that the Defendant "[o]btain(ed) or exercise(d) unau-
thorized control over the property of John Chamberlain, Ned 
Gregerson, Robert Nelson, Neal Mortensen, and others with a 
purpose to deprive them thereof . . ." as alleged in the Amended 
Information. 
Furthermore, Defendant requested certain jury instructions 
at trial as set forth in Point III infra which were denied but 
which would have clarified the status of partnership property and 
the limited partner's relationship to the partnership property. 
These instructions were essential statements of the law and would 
have demonstrated that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
verdict of guilty. 
It is very clear that if the alleged limited partner victims 
in the instant case had a grievance with the manner in which the 
Defendant handled the funds from the sale of the Mobile Home Park 
in Las Vegas, they had the same right that any creditor of the 
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limited partnership would have under Utah law to bring a civil 
action against the General Partner. 
In Wall Inv. Co. v. Garden Gate Distributing, 593 P.2d 542 
(Utah 1979) the Utah Supreme Court held: "Limited partnerships 
were unknown to the common law and are, like corporations, crea-
tures of statute . . . Moreover there is a specific legislative 
recognition that a limited partnership as an entity distinct 
from its partners, can bring suit." 593 P.2d at 544. 
Partnership law uniformly holds that limited partners do not 
have any ownership interest in assets or property of the partner-
ship. Maxco, Inc. v. Volpe, 274 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. 1981); 
Wroblewski v. Brucker, 550 F.Supp. 742 (W.D.Okla. 1982); Bossier 
v. Lovell, 410 So.2d 821 (La. 1982); Central Allied Profit 
Sharing Trust v. Bailey, 759 P.2d 849 (Colo. 1988); Cramer v. 
McDonald, 396 N.E.2d 504 (111. 1979). The Utah Limited Partner-
ship Act is to be construed to effectuate its general purpose and 
make Utah's law uniform with other states. U.C.A. § 48-2a-1001. 
The Amended Information filed in this case alleged that the 
Defendant "[o]btain(ed) or exercise(d) unauthorized control over 
the property of John Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson, 
Neal Mortensen, and others with a purpose to deprive them there-
of. . . ." (R. 1729). However, the property that they were 
allegedly deprived of, a portion of the $838,000.00 proceeds from 
the sale of the Mobile Home Park, was property of the partnership 
itself, and not the property of the individual partners. There-
fore, the State's evidence at trial failed to prove the allega-
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tion in the Amended Information, i.e., that the property of 
individuals was "stolen" from those individuals. 
This argument becomes particularly significant when it is 
noted that in Paragraph 2.2 of the Certificate and Agreement of 
Limited Partnership for Three Crowns, Ltd., the partnership was 
given the authority to "engage in or possess any interest in 
other ventures which may or may not have similar business pur-
poses as those set forth. . .". (R. 1689, Exhibit A attached 
thereto p. 2). Further, Paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2 clearly indicated 
that distribution of any partnership assets or proceeds was 
"subject to maintaining the partnership in a sound financial and 
cash position. . ." and "such distributions of cash or other 
property would be made to the limited partners only when the 
General Partner, in his absolute discretion, determines such is 
not needed in the operation (of the partnership), but any distri-
bution will be made only if, in the absolute judgment and discre-
tion of the General Partner. it will not in any way jeopardize or 
limit the business of the partnership." (Emphasis added) (R. 
1689, Exhibit A p. 2). 
Furthermore, the Partnership Agreement provides in Section 
15.1 that "the General Partner shall be solely responsible for 
the management of the partnership business with all rights and 
powers generally conferred by law or necessary, advisable or 
consistent in connection therewith." (R. 1689, Exhibit A p. 6). 
In addition to the foregoing, the Partnership Agreement in 
Section 15.2, Subsection P provides that among the rights and 
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powers to be held exclusively by the General Partner would be the 
power to "sell all or substantially all of the assets of the 
limited partnership without the consent of the limited partners." 
(R. 1689, Exhibit A p. 8). The General Partner, upon termination 
and dissolution of the partnership, is given the power under 
Paragraph 21.1, Subsection C to terminate and dissolve the 
partnership upon "(S)ale of all properties acquired by the 
partnership if the General Partner in its sole discretion deter-
mines there is not a compelling reason to continue the partner-
ship." (R. 1689, Exhibit A p. 13). Also, Section 23.1 provides 
for a power of attorney granted by the limited partner to the 
General Partner concurrently with the execution of the Partner-
ship Agreement to "take any further action which said attorney 
shall consider necessary or convenient in connection with any of 
the foregoing hereby giving said attorney full power and authori-
ty to do and perform each and every act and thing whatsoever 
requisite and necessary to be done in and about the foregoing as 
fully as said limited partner might or could do if personally 
present, and hereby ratifying and confirming all that said 
attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof." 
(R. 1689, Exhibit A p. 14). 
The Defendant introduced at trial the Subscription Agreement 
of each of the named individuals in the Amended Information, and 
each of them did in fact provide through those Subscription 
Agreements the power of attorney referred to in Section 23.3 of 
the Partnership Agreement (R. 1689, Exhibit A p. 15). 
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It should therefore be readily seen by the Court, that 
pursuant to Utah law, a limited partner simply stands in the 
shoes of a normal creditor with regard to any distributions he 
feels he is entitled to receive at any time. Given the discre-
tionary powers granted to the General Partner as outlined above, 
and the fact that no limited partner had an ownership interest in 
the proceeds of the sale of the Mobile Home Park in Las Vegas, 
the State utterly and completely failed to prove that Defendant 
Larsen obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the 
property of John Chamberlain, Ned Gregerson, Robert Nelson, Neal 
Mortensen, and others with a purpose to deprive them thereof. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GIVE SPECIFIC 
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT. 
A. Instructions Re: Limited Partnerships. 
It is the position of Defendant Larsen that his right to due 
process of law and a fair trial in the instant matter was denied 
under both the Utah and United States Constitutions when the 
Court failed to give the jury certain specific instructions. The 
Defendant requested jury instructions at trial as follows: 
1. "At the time a limited partner becomes entitled to 
receive a distribution from the limited partnership, he has the 
status of, and is entitled to all remedies available to, a 
creditor of the limited partnership with respect to the distribu-
tion." 
2. "Where two persons create a relationship of debtor and 
creditor, a failure of one of the parties to pay over money in 
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satisfaction of the debt does not constitute the crime of theft." 
3. "A limited partner has no interest in the specific 
assets of the partnership by virtue of his status as a limited 
partner; rather he simply owns a percentage interest in the legal 
entity which is the limited partnership." (R. 1860). 
Even though the Defendant submitted these three instructions 
as "Defendant's Proposed Additional Jury Instructions" on Decem-
ber 11, 1990, they were, for unknown reasons, excluded from the 
record of this case (See Affidavit of Larry R. Keller, Add. 3). 
The Court refused to give the first two but did give the 
third to the jury, and the Defendant took appropriate exception 
thereto. The Court's failure to give these instructions denied 
the Defendant his theory of the defense and constituted revers-
ible error per se. 
As authority for the proposition that these instructions 
should have been provided to the jury, the Defendant cited U.C.A. 
§ 48-2a-606 quoted verbatim for the first instruction mentioned 
above. Defendant cited the case of State v. Siers, 248 N.W.2d 1 
(Neb. 1976) as authority for allowing the Defendant's second 
requested instruction. As to the third requested instruction, 
the Defendant cited State v. Birch, 675 P.2d 246 (C.A. Wash. 
1984) and Evans v. Galardi, 546 P.2d 313 (Cal.S.Ct. 1976). The 
Defendant further cited U.C.A. §§ 48-2-22, 48-2-23, 48-2a-606, 
and 48-2a-703 as examples of Utah's partnership law which stood 
for the proposition outlined in Defendant's proposed third 
instruction mentioned above. 
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The failure of the Court to give all three of these jury 
instructions which accurately reflect Utah law regarding limited 
partnerships, meant that the jury had an incomplete understanding 
of what would have been necessary for the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order for the Jury to find the Defendant 
guilty. The Defendant therefore was denied his right to a fair 
trial and he should be granted a new trial with the aforemen-
tioned instructions proposed by the Defendant given to the jury 
at that new trial. 
B. Instruction Re; Time of Forming Intent. 
Defendant Larsen requested that the Court provide the 
following instruction to the jury: 
In order to convict the Defendant of the 
crime of Theft, it is necessary for you to 
find that the intent to steal existed at the 
time of the taking of the property, and no 
subsequent felonious intent will suffice. 
Therefore, if you find that at the time the 
Defendant C. Dean Larsen is alleged to have 
obtained or exercised unauthorized control 
over the property of John Chamberlain, Ned 
Gregerson, Robert Nelson and Neal Mortensen, 
he did not have the intent to steal their 
property, no subsequent felonious intent will 
suffice and you must conclude that the State 
has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the element of intent to commit the crime of 
Theft. 
R. 1838. 
The Court refused to give this instruction, and the Defen-
dant took an exception. 
The intent to steal in a theft case must have existed at the 
time of the taking and no subsequent felonious intent suffices to 
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carry the State's burden of proving Theft. People v. Miller, 4 
Utah 410, 11 P. 514 (1886); State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P. 84 
(1920); see State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568 (Utah 1985). 
Defendant Larsen maintains that the failure of the Court to 
give this specific instruction meant that the jury did not have 
full information regarding the elements of the crime in this 
particular case. In State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991), 
the Utah Supreme Court held: 
. . . The jury must be instructed with re-
spect to all the legal elements that it must 
find to convict of the crime charged, and the 
absence of such an instruction is reversible 
error as a matter of law. State v. Lane, 618 
P.2d at 35. In State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 
235 (Utah 1985), we stated, "The general rule 
is that an accurate instruction upon the 
basic elements of an offense is essential. 
Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible 
error." Id. at 239 (Utah 1985) (citing Lane, 
618 P.2d at 35). See also State v. Harmon, 
712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986) per curiam; 
State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1252 (Utah 
1984). Thus, the failure to give this in-
struction can never be harmless error. 
823 P.2d at 1061. 
It is the position of Defendant Larsen that the Court's 
failure to accurately inform the jury that the intent to steal 
must have existed at the time of the taking of the property, and 
no subsequent felonious intent would suffice, means that the jury 
was not properly instructed as to the elements of this offense, 
and a reversible error of law occurred. The Court should grant a 
new trial in this case for this reason alone. 
C. Good Faith Instruction. 
The Defendant proposed the following instruction: 
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Good faith, as commonly used, means a 
belief or state of mind denoting honesty of 
purpose or freedom from intention to commit 
theft. 
If the evidence in this case leaves you 
with a reasonable doubt whether the Defendant 
obtained or exercised control over the prop-
erty of another in good faith, then you 
should find the Defendant not guilty of 
Theft. 
R. 1842. 
The Court's failure to give this instruction denied the 
Defendant his right to due process of law under both the Utah and 
the United States Constitutions. 
If there is sufficient evidence to support a proposed jury 
instruction on any issue, the trial court has a duty to adequate-
ly instruct the jury if defendants so request. State v. Smith, 
706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985). The trial was replete with informa-
tion from numerous witnesses, including Defendant Larsen himself 
that the actions taken by the Defendant in dealing with the 
proceeds of the sale of the Three Crowns Mobile Home Park in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, were all undertaken in "good faith." The Defen-
dant testified that he believed at all times that he had the 
authority to deal with the proceeds in the manner in which he did 
and that he at all times acted in good faith. Because the 
evidence was clear on this point, the Court should have given the 
good faith instruction requested by the Defendant, and its 
failure to do so constitutes an error of law which should result 
in a new trial. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO IMPEACH 
THE DEFENDANT THROUGH THE USE OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
ENTERED ON 18 COUNTS OF SECURITIES FRAUD. 
A. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court did 
have discretion to exclude the Defendant's prior con-
victions* 
Prior to the trial of this matter, the Defendant made a 
Motion to Exclude Evidence of Prior Convictions dated November 
21, 1990 (R. 1650, 1651). Defendant Larsen had been convicted of 
18 counts of Securities Fraud on August 6, 1990. The trial in 
the instant case began on December 4, 1990. The Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon denied Defendant's motion and ruled that the 
State could ask the Defendant about his prior felony convictions 
if he testified in the trial, and he would be required to answer 
truthfully. Judge Russon also ruled that Defendant would be 
allowed to make the statement that his convictions were on appeal 
(R. 2056 p. 92). 
As a matter of strategy, Defendant Larsen and his attorney 
recorded on the record their position that Defendant Larsen's 
attorney would ask Defendant Larsen about his convictions when he 
took the stand to testify in the case on direct examination. 
Defendant Larsen thus preserved his record with regard to the 
Motion to Exclude Evidence of Prior Convictions, since it was 
stated clearly for the record that defense counsel would not have 
asked Mr. Larsen about his convictions had the Court not denied 
his Motion to exclude the convictions. The State clarified on 
the record that it did intend to ask Mr. Larsen about his convic-
tions, and defense counsel further clarified the fact that the 
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testimony of the Defendant was essential to his defense in the 
case (R. 2056 p. 92). 
The Defendant was originally bound over by the Third Circuit 
Court on a single Information alleging 42 counts. The Defendant, 
on April 24, 1990, filed with this Court a Motion to Sever the 42 
counts of the Information into five separate trials. On May 8, 
1990, the Honorable Judge Russon granted the Defendant's Motion 
to Sever, "[f]or the reasons set forth in Defendant's Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities and oral argument. . .". 
Despite the State's efforts to rejoin the remaining counts 
once the first trial involving 18 counts of Securities Fraud had 
occurred, Judge Russon once again ruled that the counts would 
remain severed as he initially had ordered on May 8, 1990. 
What the Defendant did in making the Motion to Sever and 
resisting the State's subsequent motion to rejoin the counts, was 
to exercise his constitutional right under both the Utah and the 
United States Constitutions to due process of law. Specifically, 
the Defendant argued that he could not have a fair trial if all 
these counts had been joined together. Among the reasons argued 
by the Defendant (which the Court adopted as a basis for granting 
the Motion to Sever) was that the joining of all these unrelated 
charges into a single Information was an attempt on the part of 
the State to show the "bad character" of the Defendant. Defen-
dant argued that such efforts would violate Rule 404 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
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When Judge Russon found in favor of the State by not exclud-
ing the prior convictions, the Court penalized the Defendant for 
having exercised his constitutional right to due process of law 
and a fair trial by requesting the severance of the counts 
originally contained in the Information. 
The State should not have been able to have it both ways, 
particularly in this case which required such a strained applica-
tion of the theft statute to an otherwise established business 
procedure. If the State would have had its way originally, there 
would have only been a single trial with 42 counts involved. 
Therefore, there would be no prior conviction situation such as 
exists presently for the Defendant to confront. However, having 
lost its efforts to combine all of those charges into a single 
trial, the State then argued that the trial court had absolutely 
no discretion about allowing the use of the 18 convictions 
obtained in the first trial to be used to impeach the Defendant 
on cross-examination in the upcoming trial. 
It is to be reiterated that the Theft trial came pursuant to 
the exact same case number as the 18 convictions for Securities 
Fraud. Essentially the two trials (as well as the remaining 
three) were all part of the same case. Therefore, Defendant 
adamantly maintains that the trial court clearly had the discre-
tion to exclude the prior Securities Fraud convictions because 
they were all part of the same case which was tried before the 
jury on December 4, 1990. Had the prior convictions in question 
occurred under some previous case number at some earlier time, 
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then the issue could be different. However, the fact that this 
second trial occurred pursuant to the same case number and is all 
part of the same case as the first trial should have prevented 
the Court from thinking that its discretion was so limited. 
B. The Court should have excluded the Defendant's prior 
convictions under the circumstances of this case be-
cause the prior convictions are presently on appeal. 
The Defendant appealed his judgment and sentence issued by 
the Court on August 6, 1990 to the Utah Court of Appeals, and 
said convictions were affirmed. However, the Utah Supreme Court 
has granted certiorari on the Securities Fraud convictions, and 
all parties are awaiting a final decision by the Utah Supreme 
Court on the allegations of lack of a fair trial argued by the 
Defendant with regard to those convictions (oral argument is 
scheduled September 9, 1993). Defendant argued to the lower 
court that it would have been judicially uneconomical, as well as 
a violation of his rights under the Utah and United States 
Constitutions if the Court were to allow the jury in the Theft 
trial to learn of the evidence of the Defendant's prior convic-
tions, and then those prior convictions were later reversed on 
appeal. 
Under such circumstances, the fact that the Court allowed 
the Defendant to be impeached by the State's presentation of 
evidence relating to his prior Securities Fraud convictions would 
necessitate a reversal of the conviction in the Theft case. It 
cannot possibly be considered fair and just for the Defendant to 
have been impeached by 18 prior felony convictions which are 
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later reversed on appeal. This fact alone would constitute 
reversible prejudicial error. 
While the Defendant does admit that Rule 609(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence provides that the pendency of an appeal does 
not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible, Defendant 
submits that under the circumstances of this individual case, 
which had been bifurcated into five trials under the same case 
number, the pendency of an appeal should render the evidence of 
the convictions inadmissible. Rule 609(e) was not intended to 
apply to such a situation. 
C. Defendant's prior convictions for Securities Fraud do 
not necessarily involve dishonesty or false statement. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 
(Utah App. 1988), found that all crimes do not necessarily 
involve dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. In Wight, the Defendant had a prior 
conviction for aggravated robbery and the Utah Court of Appeals 
found that, "The crime of robbery is not necessarily one of 
dishonesty or false statement" and the evidence of the prior 
robbery conviction is not automatically admissible under 
609(a)(2). 
In the subsequent case of State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093 
(Utah App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the trial 
court should make some inquiry into the facts of the prior crimes 
to determine if dishonesty or false statement was involved, and 
that the crime of Theft does not necessarily involve dishonesty 
or false statement. 
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The Information alleging the 18 counts of Securities Fraud 
in the first trial in this case claimed that Defendant Larsen 
"[w]illfully made an untrue statement of a material fact or 
omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading." (Emphasis added). Since the 
jury in that case was given two options on each count to find the 
Defendant guilty, it is possible that the jury did not find there 
were untrue statements of material facts, but rather felt that 
the Defendant had omitted informing the individuals named about 
material facts. The Court also declined to give a specific 
intent instruction in that case as requested by the Defendant. 
Therefore, as in the Wight case and the Brown case where the Utah 
Court of Appeals found that the crimes of aggravated robbery and 
theft were not necessarily crimes of dishonesty or false state-
ment, the crimes for which Defendant Larsen was convicted also 
did not necessarily involve dishonesty or false statement. 
Defendant Larsen submits that the Court is not bound by the 
mandatory requirements of U.R.E. Rule 609(a)(2) as alleged by the 
State, even if the Court rejected the arguments made in the first 
two sections of this point. 
If the inquiry goes to U.R.E. Rule 609(a)(1), as provided in 
the Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Banner. Ill P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1986), the Court must become involved in balancing the 
probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect to 
the Defendant. In making such a balancing test, the Court is 
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required to consider the following: (1) the nature of the 
crime, as bearing on the character for veracity of the witness; 
(2) the recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction. . .; 
(3) the similarity of the prior crime to the charged crime, 
insofar as a close resemblance may lead the jury to punish the 
accused as a bad person; (4) the importance of credibility issues 
in determining the truth in a prosection tried without decisive 
non-testimonial evidence 
. . .; and (5) the importance of the accused's testimony, as 
perhaps warranting exclusion of convictions. 
Under the Banner test, the Court can see that it may have 
been determined that the nature of the 18 counts of Securities 
Fraud were such that they didn't necessarily have a bearing on 
the veracity of the Defendant; and even though the convictions 
were recent, the similarity of the prior crimes to the charged 
crime of Theft may lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad 
person, rather than decide the case on the evidence presented. 
Furthermore, there was no decisive, non-testimonial evidence with 
regard to the crime of Theft in the trial held on December 4, 
1990. Rather, the State relied on a convoluted series of trans-
actions in an effort to convince the jury that the Defendant 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of the named 
alleged victims with a purpose to deprive them of that property. 
Looking at the last point of the balancing test, the 
accused's testimony was extremely important in light of the fact 
that the evidence was all circumstantial and was primarily the 
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result of a convoluted tracing of transactions by the State's 
witnesses. The intent with which the Defendant acted was essen-
tial to the case. 
If all of these items are balanced, and the Court takes into 
consideration that the theft trial was only one more trial under 
the same case number with an Information which originally alleged 
42 counts by the State's choice, the Court can readily see that 
the probative value of the admissibility of these convictions far 
outweighed the prejudicial effect, in that the Defendant's right 
to a fair trial was denied. 
Because we are still dealing with the same case, Defendant 
believes that the Court should have been compelled to the conclu-
sion that the prior 18 Securities Fraud convictions should not 
have been admitted, and the mandatory provisions of U.R.E. Rule 
609(a)(2) did not apply under these circumstances. However, even 
if the Court determined that the mandatory provisions were 
applicable in this situation, the crimes with which the Defendant 
was previously convicted, Securities Fraud, do not automatically 
involve dishonesty or false statement and the Court should be 
allowed to proceed to the balancing test allowed under U.R.E. 
Rule 609(a)(1) and the reasoning of the Court in Banner. Under 
such a balancing test, the Court must conclude that the prior 
convictions should have been excluded. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Banner, supra, stated 
that "Utah's Rule 609 is the Federal rule verbatim," and advised 
that "Federal case law should be consulted for advice interpret-
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ing the rule." Because subsection (2) of Rule 609 is purely 
mechanical in its operation, the range of offenses encompassed by 
the phrase "dishonesty or false statement" is a crucial issue. 
Federal rule 609 is a hybrid product of various legislative 
approaches resulting from the confusion of prior law. Although 
some form of dishonesty or false statement may be thought to 
adhere in nearly all crimes, the legislative history indicates 
that a narrow construction of the phrase was understood by those 
who voted this rule into law. See 31 Rutgers L.Rev. 908, 923 
n.104. Further, the nature of automatic admission of prior 
convictions itself, which recognizes no special or extenuating 
circumstances such as we find in subsection (1) of the rule, 
speaks to the need for a narrow construction of the term "dishon-
esty or false statement." U.S. v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2nd 
Cir. 1977), cert denied 434 U.S. 867 (1977). 
Congress did not provide final guidance as to which crimes 
involve "dishonesty or false statement." Rule 609(a)(2) is an 
anachronism in the Federal (and therefore State) Rules of Evi-
dence. With few exceptions evidence is admitted pursuant to 
rules 401, 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence focusing on 
legal relevancy under the control of the trial court's discre-
tion. In Rule 609(a)(2) by legislative fiat, the relevancy 
determination by the trial court is decided and the trial court 
apparently has no discretion in the matter. 
Due to the unfair aspects of this mechanical operation of 
the rule, several courts have attempted to solve the problem by 
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narrowly interpreting the words of the statute under Rule 
609(a)(2). In U.S. v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that the crime 
defined by Rule 609, subsection (2) must contain "an intent to 
deceive or defraud." Thus, by limiting the crimes included under 
the dishonesty section (subsection (2)), most prior crime deci-
sions will be decided under Rule 609(a)(1) in accordance with the 
general intent of Congress and the method advocated by the body 
of the Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the standard which requires 
a crime to include an element of intent to deceive or defraud 
would possess the advantage of ease of application. Courts are 
more familiar with crimes of this nature and the conference 
report's initial list serves as a reference. At the same time 
such a test will force a court to look beyond the label of the 
offense to an investigation of whether it involved an intent to 
deceive. Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 281 (3rd Cir. 
1976); see also, 71 NW.U.L.Rev. 655, 657: Rule 609(a)(2) Dishon-
esty and False Statement (1976). 
The Federal Court of Appeals in Millings recognized that the 
disparate legislative histories of the two provisions of Rule 609 
require a much narrower construction of the language contained in 
subsection (2). Thus it held that the possession of heroin and 
the possession of an unlicensed pistol did not fall within the 
ambit of subsection (2) because neither offense involved an 
intent to deceive or fraud. Further, the Court decided that 
since this in effect was a "close case" and involved a "test of 
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credibility", the improper admission of prior convictions could 
not be merely harmless error* 535 F.2d at 123-124. 
The most salient contribution of Millings is its recognition 
that dishonesty or false statement defines a narrow sub-set of 
crimes directly related to testimonial veracity. 31 Rutgers 
L.Rev. 908, 928 n.130. See also. State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 
217, 222 n.2 (Utah App. 1988). 
If such a careful and narrow construction is not applied to 
Rule 609(a)(2), offenses properly admitted only through discre-
tionary balancing of subsection (1) would be admitted automati-
cally under subsection (2), contrary to the original Congressio-
nal intent at the time Rule 609 was promulgated by Congress. 
Otherwise defendants would be denied the protection inherent in 
any judicial balancing process, as well as specific protection, 
namely the presumption of inadmissibility and the resulting 
proponent's burden of rebuttal, which is deliberately built into 
Rule 609(a)(1). The prosecution on the other hand, would reap 
the advantage of automatic admission without having the obstacles 
of Rule 609(a)(1). By stripping away the shield of rule 
609(a)(1), the trial court's decision in the instant case defeats 
the legislative intent to protect defendants from the impact of 
unfair prejudice and the general principle of encouraging defen-
dants to testify when they so choose. The lower court's decision 
in the instant case also frustrates the legislative intent to 
accommodate the divergent attitudes of the U.S. House and Senate 
with an intricate compromise allowing automatic admission of the 
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narrow range of offenses under 609(a)(2) while providing a strong 
built-in protection of defendants under Rule 609(a)(1). 
These considerations are particularly valid in the instant 
case. Defendant's convictions of Securities Fraud under Utah law 
were not convictions of crimes involving intentional dishonesty 
or false statement. Defendant's convictions were actually a form 
of "strict liability." One of the primary issues currently on 
appeal before the Utah Supreme Court on the Securities Fraud 
convictions is the issue of the Defendant's intent. At the 
Securities Fraud trial, Defendant Larsen vigorously argued that 
an element of a securities law violation included the element of 
intent. The State argued that intent was not an element of 
securities fraud violations and the trial judge so ruled. The 
Defendant was thus denied a jury instruction on the element of 
intent. As a result, the jury did not consider the element of 
intentional dishonesty or false statement in its deliberations 
and ultimate finding that the Defendant was guilty of the crimes 
of Securities Fraud. 
Defendant Larsen argues that this is exactly the type of 
situation Congress intended should be balanced under the specific 
protection of Rule 609(a)(1) rather than being automatically 
admitted under Rule 609(a)(2). See U.S. v. Lipscombe, 702 F.2d 
1049, 1057 (1983). Surely the exclusion of evidence of prior 
convictions will generally result in less confusion of the issues 
and fairer trials for defendants. See 1987 Utah Law Review; 
Recent Developments at 189. 
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Where the State has a strong case, the automatic admission 
of prior convictions under Rule 609(a)(2) might presumably have 
less impact on a jury's deliberations. However, in the instant 
case where the State's position is so uncertain, the trial 
court's erroneous ruling under Rule 609(a)(2) cannot fairly be 
said not to have influenced the judgment of the jury and there-
fore, the error in this case was not harmless. See Kotteakos v. 
United States. 328 U.S., 750, 765 (1946); Virgin Islands v. Toto, 
529 F.2d 278, 283. In the instant case, evidence of the 
Defendant's prior convictions of 18 counts of Securities fraud 
may very well have tipped the scales against him. See U.S. v. 
Slade, 627 F.2d 293, 308 (1980). 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING STATE'S WITNESS JOHN BALDWIN 
TO TESTIFY CONCERNING AN INVESTIGATION OF GRANADA, INC. 
FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES VIOLATIONS. 
At the trial of the instant matter, the State was allowed to 
call witness John Cheney Baldwin. Mr. Baldwin testified that 
five years previous to his current employment he had been the 
director of the Utah Securities Division. He testified that 
three years prior to that he was an assistant Utah Attorney 
General and had been in private practice earlier. Over defense 
counsel's objection, Mr. Baldwin was asked if he was aware of an 
investigation of Granada Inc. by the Utah Securities Division 
subsequent to 1985. 
The trial judge overruled defense counsel's objection and 
Mr. Baldwin was specifically asked the following: 
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Q: (By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Baldwin, do you 
recall that one of the issues that you were 
looking at or the division was looking at was 
the sale of unregistered securities? 
A: Yes, that is correct. 
Q: Do you recall how that was related to 
Granada? Can you explain that a little? 
A: Well, there was, to my recollection, 
several entities which I would recall are 
satellites around Granada. That Granada was 
an operation in which money was going. There 
were other entities in which money was coming 
and going, and that collectively we will 
refer to that group as Granada because that 
essentially was the mother ship. We were 
again concerned that certain of these sales 
of promissory notes, securities, other types 
of instruments constituted unregistered secu-
rities which have not been registered and 
that was the basis of the discussions that we 
had with Granada. 
Q: Can you recall the magnitude of the 
amount of money that was invested in these 
unregistered securities? 
Mr. Keller: Objection. . . (Overruled) 
A: It was millions of dollars. My recollec-
tion is, as well as that, in order to recon-
cile the negotiations and to provide an of-
fering statement to our satisfaction to keep 
the operation ongoing, that collectively was 
fifteen million dollars. 
R. 2057 pp. Ill, 112. 
As if these discussions regarding unregistered securities 
violations were not enough, the prosecutor took the opportunity 
to ask Mr. Baldwin about other matters under investigation by the 
Utah Securities Division which did not relate to the Three Crowns 
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Limited Partnership or the theft alleged in the instant case (R. 
2057 pp. Ill, 112). 
Defendant submits that the Court's decision to overrule his 
counsel's objections to the aforementioned questions regarding an 
investigation of Granada, Inc. not related to the Three Crowns 
Limited partnership constituted clear and prejudicial error. 
There can be no doubt that the purpose for the introduction of 
such evidence was to attempt to assassinate the Defendant's 
character. Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that 
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith . . . ." Although there are exceptions to 
this general rule, Defendant submits that the alleged evidence of 
the Utah Securities Division's investigation was introduced for 
the sole purpose of attempting to prove that Defendant had been 
engaged in other bad acts during the period of time that the 
Three Crowns Limited matters were active. In such a unique and 
uncertain case as the instant matter, those "charged" statements 
from such an authoritative figure may have been devastating to 
the Defendant in the jury's deliberations. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows the court to 
exclude even evidence found relevant, on the grounds that its 
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury 
... ." Since the investigation of Granada Inc. as a whole did 
not involve an investigation of the Three Crowns Limited Part-
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nershipf the prejudice created in the jury's mind by allowing the 
witness to discuss an official investigation of other entities 
involved with Defendant Larsen created unfair prejudice and was a 
violation of the Defendant's right to due process of law under 
both the Utah and the United States Constitutions. 
Defendant maintains that the trial court's admission of the 
foregoing evidence over his objection constituted prejudicial 
error under Rules 403 and 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Defendant was significantly and unfairly prejudiced by the 
admission of this evidence and believes that he should be granted 
a new trial on this ground alone. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Larsen believes that any one of the issues he has 
raised constitutes unfair prejudicial error which prevented him 
from having a fair trial, in violation of his rights under both 
the Utah and United States Constitutions. However, when each of 
these issues is considered in the context of the others, it is 
very clear that overall, Defendant Larsen was denied a fair 
trial. 
It is respectfully requested that this Court reverse his 
conviction for theft and order a* new trial in this matter. 
DATED this W ^ d a y of ^ * 3 e ^ A . , 1993. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies 
of the Appellant's Brief to be hand delivered, this day of 
September 1993, to: 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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ADDENDUM 1 
1 I constitute theft in this particular case. So I therefore 
2 grant the Motion in Arrest of Judgment. 
3 I The State has a right to appeal this by statute 
4 and I fully expect they will appeal it. But in addition 
5 to that, I do make the following finding that in addition 
6 to that, if my ruling had been otherwise, I would have 
7 granted a new trial because I don't think the instruction 
8 clearly outlined that intent as is necessary in the 
9 element instructions. 1 think you can do something with 
10 a purpose but I am not sure that that constitutes intent 
11 as required by the statute and defined earlier in the 
12 statute of a specific intent to deprive. And I may be 
13 wrong in that, but that would be the second prong and I 
14 only mention that because if this does go on appeal, Mr. 
15 Parrish, you should be able to appeal that as well. 
16 MR. PARRISH: Thank you, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: So that if it is reversed, when it 
18 comes back that will catch everyone's eye so that same 
19 instruction won't be used over again. And then you try 
20 it again, and then you end up going back to the Court of 
21 Appeals again. That is a waste of resources and 
22 I everyone's time. So that is the reason I am ruling in 
23 I that regard. Okay, anything further? 
24 I MR. KELLER: Your Honor, there is one 
25 additional procedural element under Rule 23. Will the 
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ADDENDUM 2 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendant 
257ower, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
C. DEAN LARSEN, 
Defendant. 
ooOoo 
COMES NOW Defendant C. Dean Larsen, by and through his 
attorney, Larry R. Keller, Esq., and moves this Court for an 
Order reducing to writing Judge Russon's oral finding and order 
of February 19, 1991, in the above-entitled Theft matter. Said 
order granted a new trial on the Theft charge involving the Three 
Crowns partnership. 
DATED this j ^ ^ d a y of £><^ Tftffa&. , 1992. 
MOTION TO REDUCE JUDGE 
LEONARD H. RUSSON'S ORDER 
GRANTING A NEW TRIAL TO 
WRITING 
Case No. 891900927FS 
jELLER, 
.or Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be hand delivered this 2C>ik day of October 
1992, to: 
Michael D. Wims 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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ADDENDUM 3 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
KELLER & LUNDGREN, L.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
257 Tower, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff\Appellee, : LARRY R. KELLER 
v. : 
C. DEAN LARSEN, : Case No. 930286-CA 
Defendant\Appellant. : 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
LARRY R. KELLER, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I was the defense attorney for C. Dean Larsen and we 
tried his case between December 4 and 14, 1990, on the charge of 
Theft, which is the subject of the instant appeal. 
2. On or about December 11, 1990, I filed "Defendant's 
Proposed Additional Jury Instructions" which are attached hereto 
as Exhibit 1 with Judge Russon and the Third District Court. 
3. The proposed jury instructions were in addition to other 
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jury instructions I had previously submitted to the court. 
4. The reader will note that the proposed additional jury 
instructions are duplicated, with one copy bearing citations and 
the second copy not bearing citations as required by Judge Russon 
during that trial. 
5. It is to be noted that Judge Russon gave to the jury the 
third proposed additional jury instruction but refused to give 
the first two additional instructions. 
6. I specifically recall having delivered a copy of these 
proposed instructions to Mark Griffin and Robert Parrish, the 
prosecutors in the case, on or about December 11, 1990, and well 
in advance of the time the matter was submitted to the jury on 
December 14, 1990. 
7. The reader will note that the third proposed additional 
jury instruction does not appear anywhere else in Defendant's 
proposed jury instructions, and is clear evidence that it was one 
of the three that were submitted to the court as stated in this 
Affidavit. 
8. I am uncertain as to why these proposed additional jury 
instructions were not included in the record certified from the 
District Court to the Utah Court of Appeals, but believe it was a 
simple error on the court's part. 
9. The discussion surrounding these jury instructions was 
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held in Judge Russon's chambers without the court reporter 
present, and this is the reason no reference to these proposed 
additional jury instructions appears in the record. 
DATED this 7 day of ^ k ^ f c . , 1993. 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me this tfjri 
day of S e p ^ m W 1993 by Larry R. Keller. 
Notary Public ; 
XTEast200South#340 i /<> ,
 r . 
D e^mber21.wSe j NOTARY PUBLIC, /Res iding a t 
— ^ I S ' ^ — . J S a l t Lake County, Utah 
(Stamp) 
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
Attorney for Defendant 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
ADDITIONAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
C. DEAN LARSEN, 
Defendant. 
ooOoo 
Comes now Defendant, C. Dean Larsen, and proposes the 
following additional requested jury instructions. 
Case No. 891900927 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
DATED this )1 -" day of December, 1990. 
tlAJNEC. IRY R. KELLER 
Attorney f o r Defendant C. Dean Larsen 
EXHIBIT 1 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be hand delivered on this day of December, 
1990, to: 
Mark Griffin 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 




At the time a limited partner becomes entitled to receive a 
distribution from a limited partnership, he has the status of, and 
is entitled to all remedies available to, a creditor of the limited 
partnership with respect to the distribution. 
Utah Code Annotated § 48-2a-606 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
At the time a limited partner becomes entitled to receive a 
distribution from a limited partnership, he has the status of, and 
is entitled to all remedies available to, a creditor of the limited 
partnership with respect to the distribution. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Where two persons create a relationship of debtor and 
creditor, a failure of one of the parties to pay over money in 
satisfaction of the debt does not constitute the crime of theft. 
State v. Siers, 248 N.W.2d 1 (Nebr. 1976) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Where two persons create a relationship of debtor and 
creditor, a failure of one of the parties to pay over money in 
satisfaction of the debt does not constitute the crime of theft. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A limited partner has no interest in the specific assets of 
the partnership by virtue of his status as a limited partner; 
rather he simply owns a percentage interest in the legal entity 
which is the limited partnership. 
State v. Birch, 675 P.2d 246 
Evans v. Galardi, 546 P.2d 313 
U.C.A. § 48-2-22 
U.C.A. § 48-2-23 
U.C.A. § 48-2a-606 
U.C.A. § 48-2a-703 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A limited partner has no interest in the specific assets of 
the partnership by virtue of his status as a limited partner; 
rather he simply owns a percentage interest in the legal entity 
which is the limited partnership. 
